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CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON CIVIL PROCEDURE. By Thomas E.
Atkinson-James H. Chadbourn. The Foundation Press, Brooklyn,
1948. Pp. xxix, 910, $8.50.
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CIVIL PROCEDURE. By Paul R. Hays.
The Foundation Press, Brooklyn, 1947. Pp. xiii, 1067, $8.00.

THE ELEMENTS OF LEGAL CONTROVERSY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
STUDY OF ADJECTIVE LAW. By Jerome Michael.
Press, Brooklyn, 1948. Pp. xxxi, 756, $7.50.

The Foundation

Of the making of casebooks there is, quite properly, no end. This is
particularly true in the field of judicial administration, where teaching
ideas are as fluid and diverse as are the court systems themselves. Nevertheless, the stimulus toward uniformity and the heightened interest in
the subject occasioned by the adoption of the federal procedural rules
is having its natural effect not only in the practical atmosphere of the
courtroom, but in the now far from ivory towers of the professors. Willynilly, there results some definite trend toward a concrete body of material
which suggests and stimulates some similarity in attitude toward its use.
And the generally heightened interest in the widely accepted procedural
reforms of the present era accentuates this trend.
This new group of casebooks illustrates perfectly the now quite normal
paradox of a seemingly complete diversity in teaching techniques, masking
a considerable underlying uniformity. After all, the same ultimate purpose, with materials of the same or like character, is shared by all. This
is reminiscent of the changing views shown by procedural reformers
themselves. Thus when the Supreme Court's Advisory Committee on
Rules of Civil Procedure first came together in the summer of 1935, the
members were attuned to the diversities suggested by their various local
practice systems. As is usual, each was disposed to think his own the
only one really feasible; and it seemed indeed doubtful whether accord
would ever be possible. But with increased knowledge of these diversities,
together with the realization of the similarities of purpose behind them,
it was obvious that the opportunities for reasonable agreement were extensive. Eventually, and quite surprisingly, there was reached a complete accord, which has continued over the years, extending even to novel
and unusual problems covering such legal terra incognita as discovery. 1
Such agreement is hardly to be expected among teachers and would, in
fact, be unfortunate; the case system of instruction thrives only on dispute. Nevertheless the area of underlying unity is substantial.
Hence, as I view these three most modern and highly important
collections of cases in this interesting field, I am at a loss whether to emphasize most their diversities or their similarities. I do think a tribute
1. The single case of dissent-that of one member on the issue of discovery of
lawyers' files (Report of Proposed Amendments 46, June, 1946)-is to be explained
by that member's absence from meetings because of the illness which resulted in his
death before the report was acted upon. Clark, The Influence of Federal Procedural
Reform, 13 LAW & CoNTEmP. PRoB. 144, 150 (1948).
(917)

918

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97

is due the publisher for its willingness thus to venture three books which
must be mutually competing to a considerable extent. Even the volumes
of Messrs. Michael and Hays, though intended for the same curriculum
at Columbia, overlap to some extent. Thus, to cite a not isolated example, "The Substantive Adequacy of Negative Defenses" of Professor
Michael's Chapter XII brings out in part the same group of cases as the
"Summary Judgment" of Professor Hays' Chapter VI. And of course
the casebook of Messrs. Atkinson and Chadbourn cuts across the fields
of both the other books. All three are admittedly shaped by the stimulus
of the new federal rules, even the Atkinson and Chadbourn, the most
conventional of the three; all are replete with modern citations. Indeed,
they definitely suggest that earlier collections are now outmoded. So many
and so important are the recent cases illustrating modern trends in the
states, as well as -in the federal system, that casebooks only a few years
old now have a flavor of medievalism. We are indebted, therefore, to this
publisher for presenting so useful a series of books from which so abundant a choice can be made.
For choice there must always be, since every teacher of Procedure
tends to have his own private and personal approach to the field. Diversities here are certainly much more usual than in standard courses
such as Contracts and Torts-or Property before McDougal took to upsetting it.2 At any rate, it will accomplish little for a reviewer to pursue
his own hobbies and I shall refrain, particularly as I have stated mine
elsewhere in some detail.8 I will refer only to my conviction that the
teaching of Procedure has been altogether too besotted with ancient history
and cramped by the obsession of substantive teachers that it should be
an adjunct to, and an explanation of, their courses, at least on the historical level. But if history be employed, it should be only interstitially
to illustrate the modern law; and, unless we have before us the cases of
the last decade in the light of modern developments, a procedural course
is a positive loss to the present-day practitioner and a potential menace
to the future reformer. All three of these books fulfil admirably this
requirement, which I consider so basic. Hence I shall confine myself
to pointing out distinctions among the volumes, rather than to essaying
some new critique of the subject.
Of the several collections, that of Messrs. Atkinson and Chadbourn
hews more to the traditional line; it can properly be said to be a streamlined and properly modernized version of the older courses. It thus approaches the subject through the common-law forms, with Part One devoted to Actions, Part Two to Jurisdiction, Pleading and Practice, Part
Three to Equity: Separate and Unified Systems, and Part Four to Parties,
including the modern rules of party joinder. It affords a wholly admirable combination of the historical and modern approach; and even the
historically minded should not wish more of ancient procedure than is here
given. The book has the greater number of citations; at an estimate it
has more than double that of Michael's book, and four times that of
Hays', which relies extensively on quotations from texts. The material
2. McDOUGAL AND HABER, PROPERTY, WEALTH, LAND: ALLOCATION, PLANNING
AND DEVELOPMEENT (1948) ; Leach, Property Law Taught in Two Packages, 1 J. LEG.

ED. 28 (1948) ; Lasswell and McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Profes-

sional Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L. 3. 203, 248-254 (1943).
3. CLARK, CASES ON PLEADING AND PROCEDURE ix-xii (2d ed. 1940), and Book
Reviews, 28 GEo. L. J. 857 (1940), 8 FORD. L. Rnv. 293 (1939), and 47 HARv. L. Rnv.

148 (1933).
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supplied by Atkinson and Chadbourn would, I should suppose, well afford
content for two courses: an introductory background course and a modern
course in the union of law and equity and party joinder. For its purpose,
therefore, it is well designed to supersede earlier courses separated along
historical lines and to give in one space a remarkably succinct synthesis
of both early and modem procedures.
The Hays volume, on the other hand, offers a strictly modernized
code-pleading and trial-practice course-if we continue to use the older
and more familiar appellations. For its purpose there seems to me only
one serious omission, namely, the cases dealing with the union of law
and equity, which afford some of the more interesting traditional problems in this field. But I recognize, though I do not agree with, a considerable trend to treat this in a separate-and I suggest now obsoletecourse on Equity. Moreover, it must be confessed that this problem
looms much smaller than it did even a decade ago. The federal rules,
among others, have shown how easily the union of law and equity can
slip into modem ways of thinking once we are allowed to get away from
the dead hand of the past.4 Reviewers have found other absences, such
as matters of jurisdiction and the conflict of the laws; 5 but to me these
seem more properly assigned to other courses less concerned with the role
of court procedure in law administration. To be noted as a definitely
modern touch is the lessened amount of space devoted to pleading proper
and the emphasis on the more modern devices of discovery and summary judgment. Interesting, also, is the increased use of text material
in place of, or as an introduction to, the cases, resulting in a volume of
increased bulk, but fewer citations than the others. Nevertheless, as any
teacher knows, this leads to -briefer classroom treatment, because of the
difficulty of arousing sharp discussion when the cases are abandoned for
text. Since much of this material can be properly treated by precept and
illustration, in place of the ordinary mimic warfare of the classroom,
the result in this particular context should be a gain in time and effectiveness of presentation.
Professor Michael's book is more likely to provoke discussion than
are the others. For he has attempted the interesting task of charting
new paths, indeed of trying to introduce some philosophy into the subject. I find his attempt most interesting and certainly most stimulating
to all teachers in the field. I am bound, however, to express some doubt
as to its immediate utility as a tool for instructing first-year students in
the mysteries of law administration. Perhaps I am wrong; indeed, I hope
so. I may well be too conditioned by the practical problems of effecting
court reform and the usual professional resistance to moderate and moder4. Curiously enough, the only substantial issue which has arisen as to the federal
union of law and equity is the collateral one of the appealable judgment where the
spectacle of the chancellor enjoining himself as a law judge still charms the Supreme
Court, Ettelson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 317 U. S. 188 (1942), and the nostalgic
dictum of Bereslavsky v. Caffey, 161 F. 2d 499 (2d Cir. 1947), affords a point of departure for makers of casebooks on Equity, however unreal it may seem in an actual
federal case. 2 MooRE, FEDERAL PRActicE 456-460 (2d ed. 1948) ; 3 id. § 39.01 (1st
ed. 1948 Cum. Supp.); CLARK, CODE PLEADING 125, 126 (2d ed. 1947). Note the
suggestion in Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po, 69 S. Ct. 606, 614, notes 26, 27
(1949), of resurrection of the now superseded JuD. CODE § 267, the former 28 U. S. C.
§ 384, which was repealed by the new Title 28, United States Code; see 62 STAT. 992
(1948).
5. As in Cleary, 57 YA.E L. J. 672 (1948); Blume, 1 J. LEG. ED. 143 (1948);
MacDonald, 48 COL. L. Rv. 660 (1948); cf. Ladd, 61 HAv. L. Rav. 1084 (1948),
and Schaefer, 43 ILL. L. Rav. 127 (1948).
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ately vocalized changes to expect ready acceptance of still deeper probing in the need and purpose which should activate our ponderous judicial
machinery. Thus it may well be that the problem of stating a case in
the complaint can be best visualized by a journey through "The Legal and
Factual Conditions of A Remedy," leading to "The Substantive Adequacy
of the Facts Stated" and "The Procedural Regularity of the Statement
of Facts," as a substitute for the old dichotomies of law, fact, or evidence,
or the more modern ones of special versus general or notice pleading.
Of course these titles do not give the whole flavor of the book; of course,
too, there is much more of familiar stuff--e. g., such as our friend the
demurrer, and how it may, at times, "search the record"-than is here indicated. But I think this does suggest the editor's attempt to erect a
broader intellectual base for the ordinary down-to-earth procedural operations. Even though some sad teaching experience suggests a lag before
this will produce the stimulating results in the classroom it deserves, no
one can doubt that over a somewhat longer interval it will contribute
greatly to the needed re-awakening of student and teacher.
Hence, choice for use among these volumes must, as ever, depend on
personal predilections. Since all three seem to me so much better for
the present day than the older collections, I must end by recommending
them all. In a judicial vacation to be spent this summer in law teaching,
I am about to show a practical preference for Professor Hays' book; but
this is only because it so easily and completely typifies the course on
modern pleading and procedure to which I have accustomed myself. The
Atkinson-Chadbourn volume covers a broader field, with a fine sweep
of the centuries. The Michael book opens new vistas. But the Hays
version is modern state and federal procedure.
Charles E. Clark.t

CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON CIVIL PROCEDURE.

kinson-James H. Chadbourn.
1948. Pp. xxix, 907, $8.50.

By Thomas E. At-

The Foundation Press, Brooklyn,

What the first-year procedure course should include is a perennial
question but regardless of the juggling process a law school curriculum
may undergo, there is no doubt about the need for such a course, supported by a substantial time allowance. The objectives of such a course
may be two-fold: a study of procedure with the aim of understanding
procedure, and a study of procedure to enable the student to understand
substantive law and to appreciate its application. With the great emphasis placed upon procedure by the members of the bar with their
legal institutes and other professional meetings held for the purpose of
studying new state and federal rules of civil procedure, it would indeed
be odd for the student to emerge from law school without a thorough
background in this subject. Resourcefulness in procedure involves an understanding of it both in its entirety and in the detailed operation of the
major procedural devices.
There was a time when there was much discussion of whether procedure could be taught, whether really it did not have to be learned in
'Ijudge, United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

19491

BOOK REVIEWS

practice. While there is still much to be learned in practice, Procedure
has become one of the most basic courses in any modem law school
curriculum. Skill in the use of procedure may depend upon experience
in practice, but an understanding of the problems and their solution can
and shbuld be acquired through law school study.
The modem case and materials book provides a much better source
for the study of procedure than was available in the past. The casebook
under review is one of the best. It emphasizes the use of cases but does
not neglect the materials. Chapter I, the introduction, is a good opening for a first-year student. The method of briefing a case and the explanation of the court system should fill a first-year need. This introduction explains the procedural steps in an action and discusses the various
purposes which are served by the pleadings. It is particularly helpful
to introduce the question of purposes as an aid to evaluating decisions
at the very beginning of law study. It will orient the lawyer-to-be in
an atmosphere in which the rules of pleading are to be considered not
as an art for the 61ite among practitioners, but as practical devices which
must meet the needs of litigants and satisfy the interests of the community
in the efficient administration of justice.
Originally written materials explain the writ system in the second
chapter. Textual material by the authors is found at the beginning of
many of the chapters or sections of the book, explaining, for instance, the
origin and historical development of trespass, case, replevin, ejectment
and equity. The original writing by the authors throughout the casebook is very well done. It is concise and exact. Few words have been
wasted. The book, however, consists largely of carefully selected cases
and illustrative statutes, supplemented by footnotes which include statutes,
civil procedure rules, law review material and cases. The editors state
that they believe the subject of Procedure may best be presented through
the medium of cases, and they have used many of the earlier decisions.
This would be expected in a subject in which there is an introductory
background in common-law actions and pleading. In dealing with modern
procedure, however, they have used many of the most recent cases under
both the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and recent state procedural
acts.
The first 104 pages are devoted to the common-law actions, including trespass, case, trover, detinue and replevin, ejectment, and debt,
covenant, and assumpsit. The reviewer is happy to see the inclusion of
this material, because it is believed that familiarity with it is essential
to the education of a lawyer. This is legal culture. This book gives
enough of the common-law forms of action to provide the background for
the interrelated development of the substantive law and procedure. It
is essential that the beginning student have a careful understanding of
the common-law forms of action in order that he may appreciate the
development of the substantive law."
Study of the earlier common-law remedies is useful for a reason apart
from its contribution to an understanding of substantive law. It is also
essential groundwork to an understanding of what modern procedure
seeks to accomplish.
The danger in modern teaching of procedure lies in neglecting to
create appreciation of the historical development of procedure and substantive law as a joint process and in neglecting to provide an insight to
1. See Ladd, Book Review, 88 U. OF PA. L. REv. 762 (1940), discussing
(3d ed. 1939).

AND CHADBOURN, CASES ON CIVIL PROCEDUPE
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the rigid niceties of common-law pleadings, which current practice seeks
to avoid. The treatment of common-law pleading in this casebook is not
burdensome. It is enough to satisfy the need and no more.
The abolition of the forms of action is considered largely through
cases showing the struggle of the law to eliminate historical formalism
and to adopt a practice designed to inform the parties and the court of
the facts out of which the litigation arose, rather than state with meticulous
perfection the theory of legal cause to which it was hoped the facts
provable might conform. The difficulties in the transition from theory
pleading to fact pleading is well illustrated in this section. Part One
of the book concludes with Chapter IX, splitting and joining causes of
action. This is developed through cases, the Federal Rules, and illustrative state statutes. Concisely presented, it adequately warns of the
dangers of merging and barring an entife claim when suing upon a part
of it, covers the duplicity of law suits, and shows affirmatively the
broadened conception of joinder of actions. The meaning of "transaction", "cause of action", and "subject of action" is demonstrated through
an excellent selection of cases and footnotes.
The joinder of causes of action is treated separately from the subject of parties, which is considered in Part Four. There is much to be
said in favor of studying joinder of causes of action in connection with
joinder of plaintiffs and joinder of defendants. The hard cases such as
Ader v. Blau,2 present both. Indeed, although this case is set forth under
joinder of defendants, it is also mentioned under joinder of causes of action. Likewise a teacher may find it helpful to consider compulsory and
permissive counterclaims together with the joinder problems. Basically,
the policy considerations are common to what are traditionally three
separate fields. The combination of them as a unit of study may be regarded as preferable by some teachers of Procedure. This, however, is
not a criticism of the utility of the book and its effective use in the class
room. The teacher who prefers the less orthodox approach suggested
can readily make this adjustment without difficulty. In fact it is doubted
that most teachers follow the same program year by year, but rather
prefer jumping around in the case book, altering their plan of presentation nearly every time they teach the subject.
Most of the matters mentioned above have been condensed into the
first 146 pages of the casebook. If they are to achieve their purpose, these
should be slow-moving pages in the class room, with emphasis upon the
techniques of case analysis and historical background, and upon a
thorough understanding of both procedural and substantive aspects.
Beginning with Part Two, which covers jurisdiction, pleading and
practice, the modern problems of procedure are presented. It commences
with acquiring jurisdiction and carries through each step of the trial from
personal service up to and including appellate review. The jurisdictional problem is excepionally well handled. Forms for the commencement of action under different jurisdictions are set out to illustrate the
different types of process. The manner of service is included, and the
jurisdictional problem of personal, quasi in rem and in rem actions are
effectively presented. The well-known basic cases, including Pennoyer v.
Neff, McDonald v. Mabee,4 Harrisv. Balk,5 and Hess v. Pawloski 6 are
2. 241 N. Y. 7, 148 N. E. 771 (1925).
3. 95 U. S. 714 (1878).
4.243 U. S.90 (1917).
5.198 U. S.215 (1904).
6. 274 U. S. 352 (1927).
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used. The footnotes present the associated problems. Appearance is
next considered briefly, but sufficiently for the purpose.
Chapter XIV commences the trial practice phase of the course with
right of trial by jury, followed by withdrawal of cases from the jury, instructions, verdicts, new trials and judgments. This material, with commencement of acfions, is in some schools reserved for the trial practice
course, which usually includes the following part on appellate review.
Where this work should be covered depends upon the amount of time
allotted to Procedure among the three law school years. In a substantial
number of schools, all of this material is handled in the first year, as
presented by this casebook, and third-year procedure work is sometimes
conducted through specialized study of the procedure of particular states.
With procedure presented in so many different ways and in areas of the
country where the problems of the graduates are different, it would be
difficult to prepare any first-year book which would exactly fit into the
program of all schools. This book lend itself to adaption for various needs.
Part Three of the book treats the subject of equity procedure, as
distinct from law and under unified systems. It is largely procedural'
equity, carrying through the whole scheme of equitable remedies, including decrees and review. The chapters on discovery and upon testimony
and hearing in equity are brief but well done, and should lead to understanding of the differences between law and equity procedure. This part
of the book concludes with the union of law and equity. With the elimination of Equity as a separate course in some law schools, it is conceivable
that the trial practice aspects of the casebook might have been modified
by the inclusion in its place of more substantive equity. It is doubted,
however, if such a plan would have met the needs of enough schools to
justify this variation. If such a plan is desired, a rather limited amount
of supplemental mimeographed material would adequately complement the
equity treatment and meet that need in those schools. The reviewer is
so impressed with the excellent selection of material used in the casebook
in this area that he questions whether the suggested inclusion should be
made. After all, everything cannot be accomplished in one book to meet
every need, and the plan adopted appears to be the most desirable.
Twenty-five years ago, Equity was a key separate subject in almost
every law school. It caught all of the popular interest of students that
some of the public law courses now have. Everyone felt he had to have
Equity. The course merged the procedural and substantive aspects, emphasizing mostly the substantive. Today Equity has become scattered,
and many schools do not offer a course carrying that name. Specific
performance is expected to be picked up in the property courses. Restitution includes much of what was designated formerly as Equity. Other
courses are expected to develop the equitable considerations related to
them. Has Equity become so broadcast that much of it has been lost?
It is the procedure courses which must help to fill the gap and to make
students fully conscious of the use of equitable remedies. This book
gives strong emphasis to the subject, and the materials are well handled.
The extent to which it may need to be supplemented depends upon the
entire curriculum of the particular school.
One of the most interesting phases of the book is Part Four, on the
subject of parties. Representative suits, intervention, third party practice
and interpleader are intriguing to teach, and the cases in this part of
the book are largely recent and very well selected. Extensive use is
made of the Federal Rules, which have become the pattern for procedural
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provisions everywhere. In considering the real party in interest and the
joinder of parties, plaintiff or defendant, leading older cases have been
more generally used. With these are included the modern statutes or
court rules. If the course is taught in the order of the arrangement in the
casebook, attention should be directed, as indicated by the footnote references, to the common problems of joinder of parties and of causes of
action. The subject of parties provides a strong conclusion for the course
and should maintain student interest to the end.
This book is used in the reviewer's school and has proved to be
very teachable. Throughout, the cases have been very well selected and
the comments in the footnotes show keen insight into the lawyer's problems in procedure. A particular feature of the book is its adaptability to
various arrangements of procedure in the curriculum. The book represents high quality scholarship by two able and experienced teachers of
procedure.
Mason Ladd.t

CORPORATE REORGANIZATION

S. Oglebay.

(2 vols).

By James W. Moore and Robert

Matthew Bender & Co., Albany, 1948.

Pp. 5964,

$35.00.
No alarm need be felt over the apparently terrifying size of these
two volumes. Of the 5,800 announced pages, over 4,500 have been
reserved for subsequent additions. The reservation reduces the work
to manageable proportions, 1,273 pages in all, and would seem to invite
comparison with an earlier work, Finletter, The Law of Bankruptcy Reorganization. Differences in approach and content, however, render comparison somewhat impossible. Messrs. Moore and Ogelbay have not attempted a critical and analytical work; intead they have given us an
exhaustively annotated statute, each section discussed in its proper order.
Finally, although now published as a separate work in two volumes, these
two volumes are simply a reprint of Volume 7 of Collier on Bankruptcy,
and there are, therefore, liberal text and footnote cross-references to that
work, which detract somewhat from the usefulness of the book as a separate
reference work.
The authors give us first the text of the statute itself, all of the sections in one article being stated. This is followed by a series of crossreferences in fine print, then by a detailed table of sectional headings and
subheadings of the authors' discussion, which proceeds on a section by
section basis. While such a format has its disadvantages, if the reader
knows in advance that his problem involves the interpretation of a given
section or sections of Chapter X, he can readily find all that the authors
have to say about it, and in the main can learn enough about the cases
cited to narrow substantially the field of necessary research.
Finletter, on the other hand, approached the problem from a functional point of view, collecting in one chapter, for example, all matters of
valuation, not only arising under Chapter X, but under the other rehabilitation chapters of the Bankruptcy Act as well, and discusses the
sections of Chapters I to VII where they are applicable. Finletter, then,
is a better starting point for the student and for the lawyer who is not too
familiar with the field.
t Dean, College of Law, State University of Iowa.
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It must, indeed, be disheartening to any author to write in a swiftly
moving field of law, for much that he writes becomes out of date, sometimes even while the presses are printing his book. This has happened
to our authors. Between press time for the book and press time for the
preface, the United States Supreme Court in Williams v. Austrian,' reversed a lower court decision criticized by the authors. It is a tribute
to the sound judgment of James William Moore in matters of procedure
and jurisdiction that he argued that in Chapter X proceedings, the trustee
in reorganization could have the issues in a plenary suit determined by
a federal court without regard to diversity of citizenship or amount in
however, .regarded as soundly reached
controversy. This result is not,
2
by all authorities in the field.
On the other hand, our authors were not so fortunate in at least
one substantive field, that of interest on claims accruing after the petition
is filed. Recent decisions of the Supreme Court have interesting implications for this phase of reorganization law. The authors state: "In
corporate reorganizations the 'absolute priority rule' demands that the
creditors of each class receive full compensatory treatment for the entire
bundle of rights they surrender. Interest on a claim is one of such rights
and hence it is entitled to the same treatment as the principal. It is
settled, therefore, that in corporate reorganizations, as a general rule, interest on all claims, whether fixed by contract or by the applicable local
law, accrues until the date of the consummation of the plan and must
be accorded the same priority as the principal of the claim." 8 The authors
recognize the exception that the deficiency claim of mortgage bondholders
against free assets is not entitled to accrue interest subsequent to the
date of the petition, and that the same rule applies to claims of unsecured creditors in such a case. In Vanston Bondholders Protective
Committee v. Green,4 however, the Supreme Court denied a claim for
interest on overdue coupons although mortgaged assets were sufficient
to pay it. The Court founded its decision on the "equitable principles"
prevailing in bankruptcy generally, and upon the further ground that to
allow the claim would leave nothing for junior creditors. While the
holding in the Vanston case can perhaps be limited to the "interest on
interest" problem, the broad language of the opinion regarding the nature
of all allowance of interest accruing after the filing of the petition may
foreshadow an application of the Vanston doctrine to all such claims for
interest, whether the mortgaged assets are sufficient to pay them or not,
except where denial would result in a surplus for stockholders. And
the very recent ruling denying interest on tax claims in bankruptcy may
well be a part of the same pattern.5
As I was involved in the interest on interest issue before Judge
Patterson in the Interborough receivership,0 I may be pardoned for re1. 331 U. S. 642 (1947), 60 HARv. L. REv. 636 (1947), 45 MicH. L. REv. 906
(1947), 33 VA. L. REv. 764 (1947).
2. See comment, 2 HANNA AND MACLAcHAN, CASES ON CREDITORS' RIGHTS,
387-88 (4th ed. 1948), and 95 U. OF PA. L. REV. 679 (1947), commenting on the
same holding in the lower court.
3. Pp. 2816-17.
4. 329 U. S.156 (1946).
5. City of New York v. Saper, 69 Sup. Ct. 554 (1949). This was, of course, a
straight bankruptcy case under §§ 57(j), 64 (a), which are not applicable in Chapter X.
See §§ 102, 199, 52 STAT. 883, 893 (1938), 11 U. S. C. §§502, 599 (1946).
6. American Brake Shoe & Foundry Co. v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 26
F. Supp. 954 (S. D. N. Y. 1939). In an earlier decision involving the same issue,
Mack, J., said by way of dictum that under New York law such a promise was not
enforceable, 11 F. Supp. 418 (S. D. N. Y. 1935).
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fusing to pass without mention the brusque statement in a footnote 7 that
under the law of New York a promise to pay simple interest on overdue coupons still attached to the bond is against public policy. The case
cited was the Vanston case in the Sixth Circuit, and as is the case .with
many of such statements, the court relied on the Williamsburgh case 8 in
the New York Court of Appeals and federal cases citing it. The Williamsburgh case involved a bond that contained no agreement to pay interest
on overdue coupons and so is quite distinguishable and no Court of Appeals case squarely in point has been found. The New York Court of
Appeals has expressly held that an agreement made by a corporation
borrowing at six per cent to pay additional simple interest after maturity
at the rate of seventeen per cent, totalling twenty-three per cent in all,
violated no public policy of the state.9 An agreement to pay simple interest at seven per cent on an overdue seven per cent coupon is, in dollars
and cents, (and a rule of public policy based upon financial oppressiveness
should look only at the dollar cost) nothing more than an agreement to
pay additional simple interest, at about one-half of one per cent upon default. It seems difficult to believe that the New York Court of Appeals
would on grounds of oppressiveness deny validity to the agreement to pay
one-half of one per cent while enforcing an agreement to pay twenty-three
per cent because the magic words "interest on interest" are not used in
the latter case. Mathematically, of course, the compound interest, outlawed in prior New York holdings, imposed a far different burden than
additional simple interest on an overdue coupon.10 Nor has it ever
been pointed out in print that no one contested New York law before
Judge Mack in the Interborough case, so that his dictum was not based
upon a consideration of controverted points." But the point is now, per7. P. 2817, n. 14.
8. Williamsburgh Savings Bank v. Town of Solon, 136 N. Y. 465, 32 N. E. 1058
(1893). The distinction here made that there was no contract to pay simple interest
on the coupons, was also made by Judge Lacombe, sitting as special master. (B. R. T.
Receivership Record, Vol. VII, pp. 163-170.)
But see the later federal cases to the
contrary effect, e. g., Empire Trust Co. v. Equitable Office Bldg. Corp., 167 F. 2d
346 (2d Cir. 1948), refusing to distinguish the Williansburgh case.
9. Union Estates Co. v. Adlon Construction Co., 221 N. Y. 183, 116 N. E. 984
(1917).
(In New York, a corporation cannot plead usury.) In the Circuit Court
opinion in the Vanston case, this case was dismissed upon the ground that it only involved an agreement to pay a higher rate of interest after maturity and not interest on
interest. "The case is not analogous to the case at bar." In re American Fuel &
Power Co., 151 F. 2d 470, 478 (6th Cir. 1945).
10. For example, at the end of 50 years, the actual period of time involved in
one of the early New York cases originating the alleged rule, a principal sum of $100
at 7% simple interest would be $450. With simple interest on one overdue coupon,
the sum would be $472.38 and at true compound interest the sum would be $2,925.70.
Even if we assume that each installment of interest in the 50 years draws interest at
7%, the total sum will only be $1,062.50 or a little over 311% of the amount at true
compound interest. Rarely will 50 coupons be involved. Judge Clancy has said the
difference between "interest on interest," and "compound interest" is "not in character
or quantity but only in quantity." Transbel Investment Co. v. Roth, 36 F. Supp. 396,
399 (S. D. N. Y. 1940). But amount should be the decisive factor in a rule based
upon the reason that advance agreements to pay compound interest "may serve as a
temptation to negligence on the part of the creditor and a snare to debtor, and prove
in the end oppressive and even ruinous." Young v. Hill, 67 N. Y. 162, 168 (1876).
Judge Clancy has also correctly observed with respect to the alleged New York rule,
"It is an odd circumstance that none of the cases that we have found actually enforces the doctrine they announce." 36 F. Supp. 396, 398 (S. D. N. Y. 1940).
11. Judge Mack called for briefs on New York law as well as on the "federal
rule." All counsel involved cited the Williamnsburgh case, but the argument was on
the federal rule.
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haps, moot under the Vanston rule, except, of course, where claim is made
that stockholders have an equity and are entitled to share in the reorganized corporation.
The authors feel that the "absolute priority" rule is here to stay, and
they may well be right, and those wrong who see in the Otis case, 12 and
in the Vanston case, straws in a wind bringing on a new rule, perhaps
treating all publicly held securities as ventures upon a financial sea entitled to some sort of "general average" when the ship must be lightened
by jettisoning some of the charges against earnings.
If a criticism were to be made of the book, it would lie in the comparative allocation of space between matters of procedure and matters of
the substance of reorganization law. Important though such subjects
may be, devoting some 390 pages to "Jurisdiction and Powers of Court,"
"Petition," "Answer" and "Approval or Dismissal of Petition" seem disproportionately large compared with only seventy pages allowed for tax
aspects of reorganization and some fifteen or twenty-five pages given
over to the all important matter of valuation. Perhaps it was felt to be
enough to point out, as Finletter had predicted, that valuation here must
in general be on an earnings basis, rejecting the mumbo-jumbo of "prudent investment," "reproduction-cost-new" and the like except in the
case of nonproductive assets. But I for one would have preferred a more
extended discussion of the factors used in various situations in which value
was litigated and of the attitude displayed by the Securities and Exchange
Commission on matters of valuation in its advisory reports. It is all
very well to be told that the problem is one of earnings times the appropriate multiplier and that the S. E. C. has used rates of capitalization ranging from eight to twenty per cent.18 What, however, is the
basis upon which the pro forma earnings statement is to be calculated?
What weight is to be given to possible trends in business conditions?
What factors influenced the selection of the approved multiplier? And
a host of other questions could be asked. The authors avoid much trouble
by stating that "determination of the rate of capitalization tends to be
arbitrary." 14 Indeed, the whole problem of valuation may well become
one in which the courts will defer more and more to the "expert feel"
of the Securities and Exchange Commission and this, in turn indicates
the need for more detailed studies of the work of that Commission, and especially of the danger that multipliers may be selected with an eye to the
result desired on other unexpressed grounds.: 5
On the technical side, one misses a detailed working index, a statement of the latest volumes of reports covered, and a table of cases. The
latter especially is a useful tool for finding where the minor points that
arise in practice are discussed. While the statutory text of each article
of Chapter X is followed by a "Synopsis" giving the detailed headings
of the authors' discussion, in a two volume work, the summary table of
12. Otis & Co. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 323 U. S. 624 (1946);

58 HAuv. L. Rav. 604 (1945).
13. P. 3856. The authors state that the S. E. C. "generally uses a rate between 8%
and 10%."

14. Ibid.
15. See Billyou, A Decade of Reorganization Under Chapter X, 49 CoL L. Rv.
456, 498, and especially the table at p. 499, giving a tabular comparison of S.E. C.
estimates and vastly differing actual earnings in the years following the reorganization.
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contents at the beginning of each volume could well have been followed
by a complete table of paragraph headings and subheadings for ease of
reference.
Fairfax Leary, Jr.t

DISCRIMINATION BY RAILROADS AND OTHER PUBLIC UTILITIES.
Carolina, 1947.

By

Edwards & Broughton Company, Raleigh, North

Isaac B. Lake.

Pp. xii, 346.

This book is one of interest to economists as well as lawyers, and
particularly to those interested in the discrimination in freight rates that
continues to be borne by the South and West despite the view of the
Interstate Commerce Commission that such discrimination is unjust and
unreasonable. Regional freight-rate discrimination is not the only subject dealt with, however, as is indicated by the title.
Professor Lake reviews neatly and concisely the English law and
early cases in the United States on the subject of discrimination that formed
the background for the enactment of the Interstate Commerce Act. He
sets his course by Holmes' statement that "The passion for equality sometimes leads to hollow formulas."
The author asserts that in discussing discrimination he has approached the problem by weighing the reason for giving the preference
against the consequences to the patron disfavored. If the weighing is
done with a reasonable amount of accuracy, Lake asserts, discriminations
which should be discontinued can be distinguished from those that are
relatively harmless and which are also, from the standpoint of the utility,
supported by "sound business reasons."
The regional rate discrimination problem is presented as a part of
a logical sequence. Discussed in succession are discriminations by government order; preferences to specific patrons; preference to a class of
patrons; and preferences to patrons in a given locality, in which the
regional freight-rate problem is given attention. Remedies and penalties
relating to discrimination are the subject of the final chapter. The reviewer will presently give more detailed attention to the author's handling of the freight-rate problem, but first for some general comments.
As is true with most lawyers, Professor Lake's economic sensibilities
are not as acute as his legal ones. He points out that the Statute of
Labourers 1 was enacted in England after the Black Death to require
agricultural workers to work for their usual wages, with severe penalties
for violation, but he does not follow up by pointing out that many of those
in the body that passed the legislation freely paid higher than legal wages
to obtain the relatively scarce services of workers. Such is the working
of the simple economic principle that prices will rise when goods and
services become scarce in relation to effective demand-legislation to the
contrary notwithstanding.
Another statement with which the reviewer might take issue, although many will agree with Professor Lake, is his statement concerning what he terms the "Civil War." (Professor Lake is a more courageous man than the reviewer when it comes to disregarding the views
" Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
1. 23 EDw. III (1349).
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of the United Daughters of the Confederacy.) He declares that ".
the cause of the war was the power which the institution of slavery gave
to one individual over another" (p. 50). Going to a more fundamental
cause it would seem that the issue which brought on the War Between
the States was whether the policies of the Federal Government were to
be shaped for the benefit of the agricultural South or the industrial North.
In the opinion of the reviewer, the institution of slavery, in large part,
furnished the emotional drive to a group that economically had no large
stake in its abolition. A higher average temperature and a different
pattern of economic endeavor in the northern section of the United States
might well have given a different turn to the thinking of the thrifty
Yankees on the subject of slavery. Many will agree, no doubt, that the
policies pursued by the victors after the war were inconsistent with the
lofty ideals which should be attributed to a group advocating the end of
slavery. Professor Lake seems to recognize this in stating that "The history of the Reconstruction Period should be sufficient to remind one that
the United States has not always been a benign uncle scattering benefits
among his nephews and nieces impartially" (p. 96). The present freightrate structure may be termed a vestigial remain of the policy of the Reconstruction Period.
Those interested in the discrimination in freight rates against the
South and West will read Chapter V with much interest. Although the
author does not exhaust the subject, he gives a short, concise discussion
of the topic, including an account of the anti-trust suit brought by the
State of Georgia after waiting several years for relief from the Interstate Commerce Commission. The suit, brought as one of original jurisdiction in the Supreme Court of the United States against the principal
eastern and southern railroads, charged that the economy of Georgia had
suffered irreparable damage because of a conspiracy to exact discriminatory rates from shippers located there.
On the whole, the terminology used and the facts asserted are accurate, but in a few instances violence is done to the parlance of the
transportation fraternity. None are serious enough, however, to lessen
the value of the book.
For instance, at page 238 it is stated, in connection with an explanation of the manner in which class rates are computed, that "every kind
of article is assigned a class rating . .

."

A proper statement would be

that every article is assigned a classification rating.
Another more serious error is found in the discussion of the interim
order of the Interstate Commerce Commission aimed at alleviating the
freight-rate discriminations found to be unjust and unreasonable in the
Class Rate Investigation.2 In this connection, Professor Lake writes
(pp. 239-240)

that ".

.

.

the Commission undertook to relieve the

Southern and Western shippers from the disadvantage under which they
labored by ordering the existing interstate class rates within Southern
and Western Territories, and from them to Official Territory, reduced by
ten per cent, and by ordering such rates in and from Official Territory
raised by ten per cent . . ."

This is not what the Commission ordered.

What Professor Lake should have said is clearly set forth in the report
of the Interstate Commerce Commission as follows: "The existing interstate class rates applicable to freight traffic maying [sic] at the classification ratings within southern, southwestern, and western trunk-line territories and interterritorially between those territories, and also between
2. 262 . C. C. 447 (1945).
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those territories and official territory, will be unjust and unreasonable
unless reduced 10 per cent . . . Simultaneously as part of the adjustment, the existing applicable interstate class rates for freight traffic moving
at classification ratings within official territory . . . should be increased
10 per cent. . . " 3
The difference between the two statements is briefly this: the Commission ordered all class rates, whether intraterritorial or interterritorial,
applicable in the several rate territories under investigation, reduced ten
per cent except those applicable within Official Territory, which were increased ten per cent. Professor Lake overlooked the fact that reductions
were ordered on class rates applicable between the territories and indicated
that the rates applicable from Official were raised, when in reality, they
were lowered. Attention might be called to the meaning of "between"
in freight rate terminology as used by the Commission in its report; it
means from either territory to the other territory. "Within" also needs
explanation. This term, defined in a negative way, means not beyond
the boundaries of the territory named.
Accuracy in the statement made at page 242 by the author that "The
Commission's order involved interterritorial rates on shipments both to
and from Official Territory, intraterritorial rates within Official Territory and intraterritorial rates within each of the other territories" would
require that it be altered to account for interterritorial rates between all
the territories involved, which were reduced.
Again, at page 258, Professor Lake mixes his transportation terms
when he states that, "The United States is divided for railroad rate purposes into three classification areas. . . ." Keeping in mind that classification is a concept apart from scales of class rates, it would be more
fitting to state that the country is divided generally into three major
classification areas, Eastern, Southern, and Western; and five rate territories, Eastern, Southern, Southwestern, Western Trunk-Line, and Mountain-Pacific.
Incidentally, all the classification areas, and all the rate territories
except Mountain-Pacific, were included in the Class Rate Investigation.
In describing the suit brought by the State of Georgia charging
monopolistic practices on the part of the railroads and their rate bureaus,
Professor Lake did not foresee, and could not reasonably be expected
to have foreseen, that the 80th Congress would enact into law the ReedBulwinkle Bill, 4 which allows these rate bureaus to obtain immunity from
the anti-trust laws-and incidentally from Georgia's charges. Neither
could he be reasonably expected to have forseen that the Interstate Commerce Commission would meekly ask, not order, the railroads to draw up
the uniform freight classification necessary to replace the existing unlawful systems of classification, in order to give justice in class rates to the
South and West. The railroads promptly put the task of compiling a uniform freight classification in the hands of one of the monopolistic groups
under attack in the Georgia suit. There it languishes today with the
result that the South and West do not have the parity in freight rates with
the East that the Commission in 1945 found to be necessary.
Professor Lake quotes from Mr. Justice Jackson's dissent to the rul5
ing of the majority in New York v. United States that the Interstate
3. Id. at 449.
4. 62 STAT. 472 (1948), 49 U. S. C. A. § Sb (Supp. 1948).
5. 331 U. S. 284 (1947).
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Commerce Commission was correct in finding that discrimination in class
rates could be removed by raising class rates in Eastern Territory, and
lowering those applicable in and between the southern and western rate
territories and between these rate territories and Eastern Territory. Mr.
Justice Jackson said: "The Court's approval of this order is based on an
entirely new theory of 'discrimination.' It has never been thought to be an
unlawful discrimination to charge more for a service which it cost more
to render." 6 It might have been pointed out that Mr. Justice Jackson
apparently did not read the record before the Commission, or did not understand it if he read it, because the record plainly shows, and the Commission so found, that the cost of rendering rail transportation in the
South is less than in the East, although southern class rates were substantially higher than those of the East.
A general comment might be made that Professor Lake did not call
attention to the pioneering work done by members of the staff of the
Tennessee Valley Authority in the field of regional freight-rate discrimination, but contented himself for the most part with citing less important
writings on the subject.
No further observations are necessary on the minor discrepancies
contained in Professor Lake's excellent work. These errors are extremely
minor in comparison with the excellent material generally contained in
the treatise. Calling attention to two groups of observations made by the
author will illustrate the quality of his work.
At page 269 it is said that "Carrier competition, subject to Commission supervision, is a far more effective means than Commission investigation alone of combating unreasonable preferences to patrons in a
given locality . . ." Further, at page 270, the statement is made that
"Certainly, carrier competition offers a much speedier method of counteracting preferential rates by other roads than a Commission hearing does.
The solution seems to be to restore active carrier competition and limit
interference therewith to cut-throat competition found to be such by the
Commission-a possible but a greatly exaggerated danger. .. ."
No doubt Professor Lake is aware that the Interstate Commerce
Commission, joined by the heavy thinkers comprising most of railroad
management, considers these incisive statements as heresy. Proof of
the abhorrence of competition on the part of these two groups, between
which exists such a beautiful friendship, is easily found, of course, in the
various utterances made in support of the Reed-Bulwinkle Bill. Too,
Professor Lake may realize that nothing less than outright government
ownership of the railroads will awaken these gentlemen from their sweet
dreams long enough to realize that the prime justification of private ownership is competition. Once competition is dead within an industry, it seems
preferable to have the control of that industry in government bands rather
than in the hands of a group of private individuals who may or may not
be aware of responsibility toward the public.
In the opinion of the reviewer, the observation which distinguishes
Discrimination by Railroads and Other Public Utilities, by Isaac Beverly
Lake, is found at page 230, where the author writes that "It is possible
to believe that the Commission is a better informed and more public
minded planner than the railroads, though that is by no means a certainty." This gem of flawless brilliance alone is enough to make reading
the book worthwhile. The transportation field needs more writers with
6. Id. at 358 (dissenting opinion).

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

932

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97

insight approaching that possessed by Professor Lake. The only suggestion offered to him is that he consult some less scholarly but better-informed persons on the subject of transportation rate terminology.
Frank L. Bartont

By Max Radin. A Mentor Book, The New American Library, New York, 1948. Pp. 190, 350.

THE LAW AND You.

Judges, lawyers, law teachers, and generations of law students have
known that anything written (or spoken) by beloved Professor Max
Radin is highly worthwhile. It is hoped that this little, inexpensive volume,
written especially for the Mentor series, will bring him before a larger
audience.
Disavowing any intention to produce a handbook of law, a manual for
law students, or "a practical guide of that deservedly reprobated pattern
called 'Every Man His Own Lawyer,'" Dr. Radin writes to his fellowcitizens, in direct, simple terms, about this thing called law and- their relationship to it throughout life. At the outset, in an endeavor to establish that "if there is any part of his social institutions which it would profit
the ordinary citizen to know something about, it is the law," the author
announces that there is no mystery to the law and he proceeds to explain
painstakingly why this is true.
He discusses with lucidity why in some respects the law is "reasonably certain" and why in others "it must of necessity be uncertain."
To remove mystery and bring understanding, Professor Radin, speaking
from long experience, gives "a glimpse into what lawyers do, why they
speak the way they do, and why the law cannot accomplish all that is demanded of it." Others than the layman may profit from reading this
dissertation.
A third of the book is taken up by a discussion of the family, parents
and children, husbands and wives, and the duties, privileges, and restrictions imposed by or through law. A heading "Keeping Our 'Blood Pure"
affords several opportunities for the delightful Radin touch. Speaking
of the Oklahoma prohibition against persons of African descent intermarrying with persons not of African descent, "This prevents Osages and
other wards of the nation, on whose reservation there is an absurdly
large amount of oil, from wasting the resources of the country on others
than Nordics."
Generally speaking, however, Professor Radin confines himself rather
strictly to factual statement and simple explanation of legal relationships
and why the law operates as it does. He could not otherwise have
covered such a variety of subjects within so few pages. His discussion
of legal procedure is (believe it or read for yourself) interesting and
informative. The severest critic of the law (its "red-tape" and delays)
ought, if he has a reasonably open mind, to be given some pause as he
reads why many procedures are necessary on grounds of fairness,
thoroughness, and protection. Let it not be thought, however, that this
wise legal scholar undertakes to convince the layman that the law is a
perfect instrumentality. It is pictured with candor as the human institution it is.
-
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